Ransomware crews now steal a copy of your data before they lock it — so even good backups don't save you from the blackmail. Insurers and regulators want proof you've actually rehearsed what happens. We write the plan with you, run drills with your leadership team, and stay on call 24/7 if it ever turns real.
Not a downloaded template. The plan reflects your stack, your team, your regulatory exposure, your insurer's specific notification requirements.
Distinct runbooks for ransomware, business email compromise, data exfiltration, insider threat, supply-chain compromise. Drilled, not just written.
Quarterly drills. The technical team rehearses the runbook. Leadership rehearses the decisions — disclosure, communications, negotiations, customer notification.
On declared incident, we activate within one hour. Pre-negotiated scope, pre-authorized to act. No emergency procurement cycle.
Every drill and every real incident ends with a written post-mortem and control updates. We update the plan; you stay improving.
Full plan review against current threat landscape and regulatory changes. Plans drift faster than people realize.
This is the runbook our IR team executes when a client declares a ransomware incident. Minute-by-minute, no narrative.
When the incident is confirmed material, the legal clock starts. Different frameworks, different windows. You need to know yours.
Most firms self-assess one tier higher than their actual position. The honest test: when did you last drill?
| Plan in a binder, never tested | Annual tabletop with consultant | Quarterly drills + 24/7 retainer + full restore | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Insurance acceptance (2026) | Declining | Yes | Premium discount |
| Regulatory acceptance | Often insufficient | Yes | Yes |
| Executive readiness | Low | Medium | High |
| Recovery time when it's real | Days–weeks | Hours–days | Hours |
| Cost of unprepared incident | Average $4.9M (IBM 2025) | ~30% lower | ~60% lower |
Quarterly minimum. Higher cadence for high-risk firms.
Teams that have practiced fix things in roughly half the time of teams that haven't.
In quarterly restore tests. Most untested backups fail their RPO when actually tried.
% of leadership who can name the IR coordinator without checking. Deceptively useful.
Backups handle the encryption half of a ransomware incident. They don't handle the exfiltration half (double extortion is standard in 2026), the regulatory notification clock, the customer communication, the SEC disclosure, the insurance claim documentation, or the executive decisions in the first hour. The plan handles those.
A facilitated discussion where the team walks through a realistic incident scenario in real-time. No actual systems are touched — the value is rehearsing decisions and communications under pressure with the actual decision-makers in the room.
Quarterly is the 2026 baseline for any firm with material regulatory exposure. Annual is the minimum to satisfy most insurers. Daily is overkill — quarterly hits the right cost/value point.
See the response runbook section above. The first hour is structured and time-boxed. The first day involves continued scope assessment, customer/regulator notification decisions, comms, restoration planning, and a lot of leadership-team interrupts. Drilled teams handle it. Untested teams freeze.
We don't directly — but we work with negotiation specialists when payment is on the table. Many ransomware crews are now on US Treasury OFAC sanctions lists, which complicates payment legally. The decision to pay or not is the client's, informed by legal, insurance, and operational impact.
US public companies must file Form 8-K Item 1.05 within four business days of determining a cybersecurity incident is material. The clock starts at materiality determination, not detection — but the determination itself can't be unreasonably delayed. We help draft the materiality framework and the 8-K-ready language before you need it.
Your leadership team in a room with us. Realistic injects. No slides, no theory. You'll see exactly where your current readiness is — and isn't.